Để mô tả chính sách tiền tệ hiện tại của Trung Quốc khác biệt thế nào với FED, một nhà kinh tế đã sử dụng một cụm từ mới “qualitative easing.”

Giáo sư Willem Buiter, kinh tế trưởng của Citigroup, sử dụng cụm từ này để phân biệt so với chương trình “quantitative easing” của FED.

Quantitative easing (QE) được FED sử dụng như một loại vũ khí hạng nặng để chống lại khủng hoảng tài chính toàn cầu, đặc biệt trong bối cảnh chính sách tiền tệ chuẩn không còn tác dụng vì lãi suất ngắn hạn đã gần như về 0.

Ngân hàng trung ương thực hiện QE bằng cách mua lại một số lượng tài sản tài chính từ thị trường, với Mỹ là trái phiếu chính phủ, để bơm thêm tiền vào hệ thống tài chính khi căng thẳng.

Theo giáo sư Buiter, chương trình qualitative easing của Trung Quốc lại khác, nó diễn ra khi ngân hàng trung ương thêm những tài sản rủi ro hơn vào bảng cân đối kế toán mà không làm gia tăng kích cỡ của nó sau đó. Ví dụ: ngân hàng trung ương TQ (People’s Banks of China) cho vay lại lĩnh vực nông nghiệp và doanh nghiệp nhỏ và cấp vốn rẻ cho những dự án hạ tầng lợi nhuận thấp, trong lúc vẫn duy trì mức độ tăng trưởng bình thường của bảng cân đối kế toán.

Để khôi phục nền kinh tế đang chậm lại, Bắc Kinh đã thông qua những gói kích thích nhỏ “mini-stimulus” như nới lỏng tín dụng cho những ngân hàng nông thôn, mở rộng cho vay cho những người đi vay nhỏ hơn và giảm phí, thuế cho doanh nghiệp.

Mục đích của chương trình này là cung cấp khoản tài trợ với mức giá hợp lý cho những lĩnh vực được chọn. Và cách làm này tuy có gây áp lực lạm phát nhưng sẽ ít hơn chương trình QE mà Mỹ đang theo đuổi.

Gần đây, ngân hàng trung ương TQ đã mở rộng một cách bí mật (covertly) 1 ngàn tỷ NDT (tương đương 162 tỷ USD) cho ngân hàng Phát triển TQ dưới công cụ cho vay mới gọi là Cho vay Bổ sung Cầm cố (Pledged Supplementary Loan). Tiền này mang ý nghĩa giúp cải tạo những thị trấn ổ chuột (renovate shanty towns) khắp nước như một cách để dừng lại động lực tăng trưởng kinh tế đang đình trệ.

Một số nhà kinh tế lo ngại việc bảng cân đối kế toán của ngân hàng trung ương không thể hiện việc tăng tiền cho vay cho các ngân hàng, và họ bảo ngân hàng trung ương TQ đã chào một hạn mức tín dụng nhỏ hơn đến ngân hàng phát triển. Thay vì QE, qualitative easing, hướng đến chi phí tài trợ thật của nền kinh tế thấp hơn.

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Bình luận của TS Giang Le

Willem Buiter, một cựu econblogger rất nổi tiếng và hiện đang là chief economist của Citigroup, đưa ra thuật ngữ "qualitative easing" để ám chỉ chính sách tiền tệ hiện nay của TQ. Thay vì tăng số lượng assets trên balance sheet (quantitative easing), PBoC giảm chất lượng của assets trong khi vẫn giữ số lượng. Cách làm này giúp TQ target credit vào một số ngành mà họ cho là có tác dụng lớn tới công ăn việc làm và giảm poverty (vd nông nghiệp, SMB).

Tôi nhớ NHNN/chính phủ đã vừa khuyến cáo vừa ép các ngân hàng phải tăng trưởng tín dụng, cũng có một số chương trình target vào nông nghiệp và SMB. Nhưng VN chưa thực sự tiến hành "qualitative easing" có lẽ do NHNN còn phải ưu tiên support cho trái phiếu chính phủ. Vì thâm hụt ngân sách và cashflow của chính phủ quá yếu nên nhu cầu phát hành trái phiếu rất cao. Nếu vừa muốn thực hiện qualitative easing vừa đảm bảo mua vào một lượng lớn trái phiếu chính phủ thì sẽ phải kết hợp cả qualitative lẫn quantitative, mà như vậy rủi ro lạm phát sẽ rất cao.

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How China’s Trying to Boost Its Economy: ‘Qualitative Easing’

To describe the nature of China’s current monetary policy and to differentiate from that of the U.S. Fed, one economist has coined a new term: “qualitative easing.”

Professor Willem Buiter, chief economist at Citigroup, came up with the phrase to distinguish the Chinese central bank’s recent moves from the much better-known quantitative easing program by its U.S. counterpart.

Quantitative easing, which was adopted by the Federal Reserve as a powerful weapon to combat the global financial crisis, refers to an unconventional monetary policy to stimulate the economy when standard monetary policy becomes ineffective, especially when short-term interest rates have reached or are close to zero.

A central bank implements quantitative easing by buying specified amounts of financial assets from the market—chiefly U.S. government bonds in Fed’s case—to inject much-needed cash into an otherwise stressed financial system.

According to Mr. Buiter, China’s “qualitative easing,” on the other hand, occurs when a central bank adds riskier assets to its balance sheet without increasing the latter’s size, Citigroup economists wrote in a research note.

In China’s context, such so-called qualitative easing happens when the People’s Bank of China adds riskier assets to its balance sheet—such as by relending to the agriculture sector and small businesses and offering cheap loans for low-return infrastructure projects—while maintaining a normal pace of balance-sheet expansion.

To revitalize a slowing economy, Beijing in recent months has adopted “mini-stimulus” measures such as loosening credit for rural banks, expanding loans to smaller borrowers and reducing fees and taxes for businesses.

The purpose of China’s qualitative easing is to provide affordable financing to select sectors, and it reflects Beijing’s intention to dictate interest rates for some sectors, Citigroup’s economists said. They added that while such a policy would also put inflationary pressure on the economy, the impact is less pronounced than the U.S.-style quantitative easing.

The enthusiasm about semantics among economists recently was reawakened after Chinese state media reported that the PBOC had covertly extended 1 trillion yuan ($162 billion) to the China Development Bank under a new lending tool called the Pledged Supplementary Loan, or PSL. The money was meant to help the bank renovate shanty towns across the country as a way to arrest stalling economic momentum. Some economists and investors interpreted the move as a Fed-style quantitative easing and expressed concerns about the unwelcomed, long-term inflationary impact of such a policy.

However, other economists, including Citigroup’s, argue that the PBOC’s balance sheet doesn’t show an exceptional increase in loans to banks, and they say the PBOC may have simply offered a much smaller credit line to the development bank.

Instead of quantitative easing, “qualitative easing—aimed at lowering the financing cost of the real economy—appears more likely,” they said.

While it’s linguistically and semantically fashionable to compare Beijing and Washington’s respective QEs, the differentiation also carries implications for understanding and investing in China.

The country’s economy recently has shown signs of a recovery. After falling for much of the year, the yuan has resumed a trend of appreciation, while the country’s long-depressed stock market also has rallied.

“We think improving growth prospects and already-accommodative credit conditions make the talk of [quantitative easing] far-fetched,” Citigroup’s economists wrote.

The PBOC’s surprise move on July 31 to let the interest rate on a short-term money-market loan to commercial lenders drop for the first time this year was also a clear sign of qualitative easing, whose ultimate purpose is to lower financing costs in the real economy, they said. But at the same time, the PBOC has started withdrawing cash from the financial system, suggesting that the central bank has no appetite to flood the market with liquidity, as the U.S.-style QE typically would do.

A significant implication of Beijing’s QE is that if the policy transmission in the broader economy turns out to be ineffective, the PBOC may resort to cutting benchmark interest rates directly, arguably the most authentic and powerful form of monetary policy easing.

Despite such a hypothesis and favorable circumstances such as a benign inflation outlook, a sustained rebound of the Chinese economy would make a rate cut less likely, Citigroup’s economists cautioned.

Another slightly negative implication of China’s own QE policy is that it runs counter to Beijing’s effort to gradually liberalize the country’s rigid interest-rate policy.

Artificially depressing financing costs in certain parts of the economy—such as by issuing cheap loans via new tools like the PSL to select sectors—effectively adds another layer of interest rates in the economy, which could further complicate and even handicap the PBOC’s efforts to make its monetary policy more effective in the long run.

Nguồn: finandlife|Giang Le Blog|Shen Hong, WSJ

SINGAPORE—Adventurous investors looking for big returns are pouring billions of dollars into frontier markets, but big fund managers say recent gains are too much, too soon.

Foreign funds have pumped $2.2 billion this year into the world’s frontier markets, which range from Argentina to Vietnam and rank as the smaller, lesser-known cousins of emerging markets. That compares with a net $720 million withdrawal from emerging markets, according to data from EPFR, a fund tracker.

The result is that as of Tuesday, the MSCI Frontier Markets Index had risen 19% year to date, compared with gains of just 6% in the MSCI Emerging Markets index and 2.2% in the MSCI World benchmark. That makes frontier markets some of the world’s best performers, but is also drawing concern that it is the tide of cash flowing into these small markets, rather than improving investment prospects, that is driving the gains.

The rally and pouring in of money have been virtually uninterrupted, even as markets in the U.S., Europe and some parts of the emerging world have started to wobble in recent weeks.

“There is an almost desperate attempt on the part of investors to capture the gains people have seen in emerging markets over the last decade [and] a real desire to believe that you can get returns in the low to mid-teens,” said Kemal Ahmed, a portfolio manager and head of Investec Asset Management’s frontier investments. Investec manages $123 billion globally.

The attraction to these fast-growing markets has been widespread. In June, Norway’s $886 billion sovereign-wealth fund, the largest in the world, jumped on the bandwagon to add frontier markets to its investments.

The problem for many investors is the opportunities in frontier markets are few and competition is fierce. Foreign ownership of many companies in the index has already reached government limits.

Ten stocks account for more than 35% of the MSCI Frontier index, according to MSCI data, and companies in Kuwait comprise nearly a quarter of the overall index’s market capitalization. Nigeria accounts for a fifth.

The total market capitalization of all stocks included in the MSCI Frontier Markets index is $109 billion, according to MSCI, compared with $4 trillion in the equivalent emerging-market index. Given the markets’ size, some investors worry about a potential, sudden race for the exits. With thin liquidity, executing sales quickly could drive frontier markets sharply lower, if buyers could be found at all, they say.

Fund managers say part of the reason frontier markets appear to have performed so well this year that some countries have been reclassified. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were considered strong enough to be upgraded to emerging status in June, shrinking the realm of frontier markets and concentrating the flow of foreign cash into fewer countries.

Gains in the remaining frontier markets have been amplified. In the year to date through Wednesday, Vietnam’s Hochiminh VN Index has risen 20% and Pakistan’s KSE 100 is 16% higher, while Argentina’s Merval index was 50% higher as of Tuesday. In the first six months of the year, frontier-market investors tracked by Morningstar Inc. MORN -1.06% earned an average return of 9.8%, compared with 4.7% in developed markets.

Some funds have been able to claim extraordinary gains in the first six months of 2014, according to the Morningstar data. Several frontier funds managed by Schroders SDR.LN -0.99% PLC, for example, have achieved percentage returns in the high teens.

Thomas Vester, global chief investment officer at LGM Investments, which is part of BMO Global Asset Management, says frontier investing can still provide opportunities to those who can negotiate the political and corporate- governance problems that these fledgling markets present. Valuations in frontier markets don’t seem excessively high yet, with dividend yields of about 4%, compared with 2.5% in emerging markets. Mr. Vester says.

LGM has $881 million invested in frontier-market funds. Mr. Vester is particularly keen on Vietnam, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Still, he warns that as a result of the hunt for high returns, money is being pumped into “less prudent companies.” Funds are flowing into frontier fixed-income investments, as well as equities, he notes.

Ecuador, for example, sold $2 billion worth of junk-rated 10-year bonds in June, just eight years after a default in 2008 on $3.2 billion of debt. The sale followed an issue of the same size by Kenya a day earlier, which attracted $8 billion of orders.

Other investors are more cautious. “The creation of massive liquidity in the U.S., Europe and Japan, created by quantitative easing and zero-interest rate policies, has lowered the bar for investor returns and it takes very small capital flows to push these markets up,” says Peter Marber, a fund manager at Loomis Sayles & Co. in the U.S., which manages about $221 billion.

Mr. Marber manages investments in both frontier and emerging markets and says he prefers larger emerging markets this year because their relatively poor performance compared with other asset classes have made valuations attractive.

Investors must remember that frontier markets are highly volatile and risky, warns Mr. Marber. “Frontier markets are the ultimate caveat emptor,” he says. 

http://blogs.wsj.com/

Một bài viết với lối kể chuyện và lồng ghép khá hay về triển vọng kinh tế toàn cầu. Đáng đọc!

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It was a matter of happenstance (coincidence) I suppose – certainly not serendipity (the occurrence and development of events by chance in a happy or beneficial way). Our meeting may have been an inevitable coming together, but it was certainly not initially welcomed by me. Happenstance is the better word. Fateful happenstance.

Serendipity rarely happens in a cab and it was in a San Francisco cab – not an Uber – where I confronted (face) my ancient past. Sue and I were headed back to the Four Seasons after a brief glimpse of the city at dusk from the “Top of the Mark.” The driver appeared to be Vietnamese, and having had a margarita or two, I unfortunately stumbled into the emotional jungles of Vietnam to which I had come, and from which I had safely departed nearly a half century ago. “You’re Vietnamese,” I said, “how old are you?” “53,” he said. “I grew up in Da Nang and escaped when I was 8 with my mother, after my father and older brother were killed.” I subtracted 8 from 53 and quickly placed him in Vietnam at the same time I had been, in 1969. “Have you ever been there?” he queried. “Well yes,” I stuttered (lắp bắp), “about the time you left, but I was in the Navy (the part of a country's military forces that fights at sea)” – an excuse that supposedly cleared me of direct involvement, but in reality was not the case. An awkward (difficult) silence followed. I wanted to say, “I’m sorry for what we did. I/we shouldn’t have been there.” I desperately wanted to say that. But I didn’t. I missed my moment of atonement and we continued on to the hotel. Getting out I gave him a $20 bill for an $8 fare – a weak apology to be sure, and he knew it. “No,” he said, “that is too much, take back 5 dollars.” I did – apology accepted – flawed (fault, mistake) as it was. He and his mother had survived and moved on. Perhaps I have too. “Goodnight,” I said. Goodnight Vietnam ....

Don’t say “goodnight,” but say “good evening” to the prospect of future capital gains in asset markets. Investors won’t be getting much of them. Financial markets have had nearly a half century of peaceful (sometimes volatile) asset appreciation fueled particularly by the decline in real and nominal interest rates from 1981 onward (continuing). We know that bond prices go up when interest rates go down, but somehow have to be reminded of a similar effect on stocks, real estate and commodities. Almost all commonsensical and historical financial models tell us interest rates are a key asset price driver. But now – and since 2012 – we have reached the beginning of the end just as I did in 1969 – the dusk of asset appreciation – because it has lost its primary interest rate driver. And after nearly 5 years of U.S. near-zero percent policy rates and global quantitative easing, which have seen the Fed’s balance sheet – to name one – expand by nearly 4 trillion dollars, and those of the BOJ and the BOE increase proportionately more, the global economy is left to depend on economic growth for further advances, and it is growth that is now and has recently been historically deficient. At PIMCO, Paul McCulley recently reminded us that structural global growth rates have come down due to a yawning (describes a difference or amount that is extremely large and difficult to reduce) gap of aggregate demand relative to aggregate supply. Economist speak, I suppose (and he’s a good one), for not enough willing or able consumers: 1) they have too much debt, 2) Boomers are getting older, 3) workers are outdated and outjobbed by technology, and 4) labor is overwhelmed by corporations with the power to contain wages at a lower rate than topline increases. Demand is deficient because consumers are experiencing their own Vietnam from a multitude of directions.

So as yields have bottomed and are now expected by the markets to gradually rise, it’s down to growth, and growth is a question mark. The U.S. for sure is near the top of the “more certain” list, but 2% real growth since the Great Recession is nothing to brag (show up) about. It would have been a bare minimum expectation back in 2010. Elsewhere, an investor not only has to wonder, but perhaps retreat from the lack of growth sunshine. South America is in virtual recession with its big three – Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela – approaching lockjaw conditions of one sort or another. Euroland is above water, but floating on water wings with peripheral country unemployment (Spain, Portugal, Italy) averaging close to 20% – unprecedented except for the 1930s. Russia is retreating for geopolitical reasons. And Japan/China are supported only by credit creation of a magnitude that reminds one of Minsky, or Ponzi, or Potemkin with his mythical villages of growth due to paper, not productivity. Where is the growth? The world as McCulley correctly analyzes it, is demand deficient and supply rich.

Asset price growth therefore – capital gains in market speak – will be harder to come by. Without the tailwind of declining interest rates which have increased profit margins as well as decreased cap rates, they will instead face structural headwinds. Let me be clearer though – clearer than I was to my Vietnamese friend. PIMCO is not saying that asset prices will go down – they just won’t go up as much as many expect. And income – not capital gains – will be the dominant driver of future returns. “Good evening,” capital gains. “Good morning,” more dependable income – even in this age of artificially low interest rates.

Our reasoning for the continuation of an artificially (unnatural) priced global asset market that may be neither bear nor bull rests with our New Neutral interest rate template. If global policy rates eventually rise, but go up less than currently expected, then asset prices and P/Es can be better supported. PIMCO believes “Old Neutral” policy rates of 2% real and 4% nominal are out. The New Neutral policy rates (U.S.) of 0% real and 2% nominal are likely to be in. The Taylor Rule – is out. PIMCO’s Clarida (Rich) Rule – is in. How so? Because a levered global economy can only stand so much. Because a demand deficient global economy requires an extended period of low interest rates in order to maintain minimum levels of consumption. Because a low growth global economy in many cases is closer to deflation than inflation. Because, because, because.

What to do as an investor? First of all, reduce expectations. Second of all, do not reach for assets outside of your risk universe. Most of all, recognize that alpha generation in a capital gains deficient, income-oriented, low total return environment is more critical than ever. 100 basis points of excess return with near similar Sharpe/information ratios is all the more valuable in a 4–5% low-returning asset world. This is where PIMCO shines. Look to our bottom-up credit analysis. Check out our selected income diversifiers in strategic asset categories. Follow our top-down macro template à la McCulley/Clarida/and our revitalized PIMCO Investment Committee. Not a promise, but a decent bet. We’ve done it for 40 years, and we’re doing it in 2014. Just check the numbers, not the headlines.

As to specific strategies, we believe high quality Treasury and corporate bonds are fairly priced, but not cheap. Our typical durations are at index levels. We believe the yield curve will gradually flatten, but not in historical cyclical proportions. We believe credit spreads are tight, but may stay there. We still believe the Fed will be on hold until mid-2015 and will hike only gradually to our New Neutral 2% by 2017. We think investors should own bonds, and an average proportion of stocks too.

As we exited our cab at the Four Seasons, my Vietnamese friend seemed to want our conversation to go on and on. “How is it that we have come to this place 45 years on,” he seemed to be asking? “Why is it that we are now at peace, instead of war? And why did you come in the first place?” Happenstance, I suppose, not serendipity. I never responded to the quizzical look on his face; a missed opportunity. Ours was not necessarily a happy goodbye nor was the extra tip an appropriate apology. But there seemed to be an acceptance and a mutual hope for a peaceful future. A new epoch (a period of history), just like the one for global investment markets.

Goodnight Vietnam Speed Read

1) Global growth rates will stay low due to a lack of aggregate demand and a continuing surfeit of supply.

2) Capital gains from almost all asset classes are approaching dusk. Low but relatively dependable income will be the market’s future driver.

3) PIMCO currently has indexed durations, a belief in a flattening but still historically steeper global curve, and credit positions that are mildly overweight.

William H. Gross 

Managing Director

www.pimco.com

Thông tin Argentina vỡ nợ nhưng thị trường chứng khoán nước ngày lại tăng mạnh TOP thế giới làm tôi ước ao “giá như bên mình cũng vỡ nhở”.

Dẫn dắt sự tăng điểm của thị trường là thu nhập của doanh nghiệp và dòng tiền đổ vào thị trường thông qua quan hệ cung-cầu cổ phiếu. Cả hai yếu tố này đều có sức mạnh, và vào những giai đoạn khác nhau, yếu tố này có thể lấn át yếu tố còn lại.

Nếu các doanh nghiệp làm ăn thất bát, chưa tạo ra thu nhập tốt cho nhà đầu tư, nhưng định giá cổ phiếu rẻ (nhìn dưới góc độ tài sản), dòng tiền trong nền kinh tế dồi dào và cứ muốn đổ vào thị trường chứng khoán thì thị trường cũng phải tăng điểm thôi.

Và dường như yếu tố thứ 2 đã và đang diễn ra tại quốc gia Nam Mỹ này.

Thứ 1, cung tiền M2 tăng mạnh trong nhiều năm qua.

 Thứ 2, cán cân thương mại có xu hướng thặng dư mạnh từ đầu 2014 tới nay.

Thứ 3, chỉ số nhà ở tăng mạnh từ đầu 2014 tới nay. Chỉ số này thể hiện tổng diện tích đăng ký để xây dựng tăng lên.

Thứ 4, Chỉ số lòng tin tiêu dùng tăng mạnh từ đầu 2014 đến nay

Thứ 5, doanh số bán xe nội địa tăng mạnh từ đầu 2014 đến nay

Thứ 6, doanh số bán lẻ có xu hướng tăng so với cùng kỳ

Những yếu tố trên cho thấy dòng tiền trong nền kinh tế đang khá dồi dào, và Money Never Sleep nên tiền sẽ tự động chảy vào những tài sản sinh lợi giúp giá cả tăng lên. Tuy nhiên, đây là sự tăng giá thiếu bền vững.

Nguồn: finandlife

Rubber glut /glʌt/ n  (a supply of something, especially a product or crop, that is more than is needed) seen persisting (continue) two more years on slowdown

A sixth year of global surplus could depress rubber prices through 2016, as maturing (adult) trees boost production and slowing growth reduces demand in China, the biggest consumer, according to an industry adviser.

Dư thừa toàn cầu năm thứ 6 đẩy giá cao su giảm đến năm 2016, khi những cây trưởng thành đẩy sản lượng tăng và nhu cầu tăng chậm lại tại Trung Quốc, Quốc gia tiêu thụ cao su lớn nhất.

Supply will outpace (to go faster, do better, or develop more quickly than someone or something else) demand by 316,000 tonnes in 2016, compared with 483,000 tonnes in 2015, according to the London-based The Rubber Economist. The adviser increased its forecast for this year’s glut by 78 per cent in March as output in Thailand, the largest grower and exporter, surpassed predictions. The International Rubber Study Group also raised its estimate saying production will increase as trees planted between 2006 and 2008 mature.

Cung sẽ vượt cao khoảng 316,000 tấn trong 2016, con số này sẽ là 483,000 tấn năm 2015. Tháng 3 năm nay, cung vượt cầu 78% khi sản lượng tại Thái Lan vượt dự kiến (TL là nước tăng trưởng và xuất khẩu cao su lớn nhất thế giới).

Futures in Tokyo, the global benchmark contract, have tumbled 26 per cent this year, touching a four-year low in April. Lower prices may boost earnings at tire makers including Pirelli & C SpA and Bridgestone Corp (5108), while squeezing profits for small farmers who account for about 80 per cent of world supply. China's economy is forecast to grow 7.3 per cent this year, the weakest pace since 1990, based on the median estimate in a Bloomberg survey.

Giá cao su đã giảm 26% năm nay, chạm vùng thấp nhất 4 năm vào tháng 4. Giá thấp hơn sẽ đẩy thu nhập của những công ty chế tạo lốp xe như Pirelli & CSpA, Bridgestone, DRC, CSM…, trong khi đó lợi nhuận của những nông dân nhỏ sẽ bị ép lại (hiện 80% sản lượng cung cấp toàn cầu do những người nông dân nhỏ lẻ sản xuất). Trung Quốc đang tăng trưởng chậm lại.

“The natural rubber market may remain in surplus until 2016,” Prachaya Jumpasut, managing director of The Rubber Economist, said in an e-mailed response to questions from Bloomberg. “Prices may remain bearish until then, unless demand picks up faster than I anticipate in China and other major consuming countries.” Futures on the Tokyo Commodity Exchange settled at ¥203.4 a kg ($2,015 a tonne) on Wednesday, down 62 per cent from a record in 2011, and fell into a bear market in January as stockpiles in China climbed.

China reserves

Inventories in Qingdao, China’s main rubber-trading hub, reached a record 270,000 tonnes as of May 16, according to Qingdao International Rubber Exchange Market.

Tồn kho tại Qingdao, trung tâm giao dịch cao su chính tại Trung Quốc, đã đạt mức cao kỷ lục, 270,000 tấn vào ngày 16 tháng 5.

Imports could expand 10.7 per cent this year to 4.26 million tonnes, slowing from last year’s growth of 14.3 per cent, the Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries said this month.

Nhập khẩu có thể mở rộng 10.7% năm nay, đạt 4.26 triệu tấn, chậm hơn so với 14.3% của cùng kỳ năm trước.

“We’re in a period of, I would say, instability in the industry,” Stephen Evans, secretary-general of IRSG, the Singapore-based inter-governmental group, told a conference yesterday in Singapore. “It’ll probably last for another year or two until we see a shift in global economic performance.”
While a looming El Niño may not be enough to reduce the glut, the weather event that brings drought /draut/ n (a long period of dry weather when there is not enough water for plants and animals to live) to the Asia-Pacific region might curb the decline in prices, according to Prachaya. The El Niño during 1997-1998 slowed production growth to 0.4 per cent in 1997 from 6 per cent in 1996, he said. There’s no evidence of any impact during occurrences in 1982-1983 and 1987-1988, according to Prachaya.

El Niño

“The impact of drought and El Niño on production will not be enough to counter the current large and rising amount of natural rubber surplus,” Prachaya said. “But, it may help to slow down the declining price trend.” Futures rose as much as 1.3 per cent on Wednesday on speculation that Thailand’s plan to reduce state stockpiles of 200,000 tonnes could be delayed after the military imposed martial law.

Ảnh hưởng của khô hạn và El Nino lên sản lượng sẽ không đủ để chống lại sản lượng dư thừa cao su tự nhiên đang tăng lên và rất lớn hiện tại, nhưng nó có thể giúp quá trình giảm giá chậm lại.

Global demand in 2014 may grow close to the IRSG’s lowest estimate of four per cent, said Lekshmi Nair, its senior economist.

“What might support rubber prices is, obviously, increased demand,” Evans said. “What is stopping everybody getting excited about the possibility of the US and European recovery is that China is apparently slowing down.”

Nguồn: finandlife|Bloomberg